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PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TREATIES: 
CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CONTRACTUALISM
John Linarelli
Rules are “mere labels for more complex ideas.”1
I. Introduction
Longstanding discontent persists about the role of international economic 
institutions in the global economy.  Some perceive globalization as producing 
substantial injustice.2  Those who find globalization to be good blithely dismiss 
the objections of those who do not.  Writing on the protests that occurred at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Seattle Ministerial Conference, Thomas 
Friedman wrote in the New York Times, “Is there anything more ridiculous in 
the news today that the protests against the World Trade Organization in 
Seattle?”  Friedman called the protestors “a Noah’s ark of flat-earth advocates, 
protectionist trade unions and yuppies looking for their 1960s fix.”3  It seems 
like neither side knows that the other is talking about - a cognitive or linguistic 
inability to understand each other.
Much of the criticism of the WTO and the other multinational economic 
institutions focuses on the power of multinational enterprises.  What power do 
multinationals actually exert on the policies and operations of these 
institutions?  The influence of the multinational enterprises has been difficult 
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 For example, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu says that globalization: 
is a myth in the strong sense of the word, a powerful discourse, an idea force, 
an idea which has social force, which obtains belief . . . It ratifies and 
glorifies the reign of what are called financial markets, in other words, the 
return of a kind of radical capitalism, with no other law than that of 
maximum profit, an unfettered capitalism without any disguise, but 
rationalized, pushed to the limit of its economic efficacy by the introduction 
of modern forms of domination, such as “business administration,” and 
techniques of manipulation such as market research and advertising. . . .  In 
short, globalization is not homogenization; on the contrary, it is the 
extension of the hold of a small number of dominant nations over the whole 
set of national financial markets.
Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market (New Press 1999).
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in Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (Yale University Press 2nd ed. 2004): 
52.
2to articulate and explain in terms familiar to lawyers and policy makers.  We 
have trouble breaking out of the barriers we are educated to respect.  Public 
choice theory informs us that we should be concerned about the influence of 
powerful lobbying groups who work within the political processes of the 
governments of the WTO members themselves.  These interest groups, the 
story goes, capture the negotiating positions of powerful WTO members and 
influence the agenda, as it is set in the WTO negotiating rounds and in the 
work done between the rounds.  They exercise a similar sway over the policies 
and operations of other international economic institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the development banks.  For example, if we 
want to understand the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs), we might want to inquire about the role of the 
pharmaceutical industry, of the film and recording industries, in assisting the 
United States Government in formulating negotiating positions for TRIPs.  The 
argument is that these interest groups persuade the governments of high-
income countries that TRIPs should contain a strong set of intellectual property 
protections that go far beyond the traditional remit of what the GATT/WTO 
framework ever aspired to previously.4  Because of such influence, the 
argument goes, the multinationals are able to get what they want, and what 
they want results in unfair agreements.  The WTO agreements, the argument 
continues, comply with few or no standards of fairness, or if they do, it is 
accidental.  They may lower tariffs and barriers to trade in services so that 
companies can effectively operate across borders, but they may also maintain 
barriers to trade to protect powerful interests who benefit from protectionism.  
These are the arguments.  I summarize them; I do not necessarily accept them, 
at least in their simple form.
Does the divisiveness derive from a lack of a consensus on a theory of 
justice with which we can deliberate about the merits of international economic 
agreements?  No legal system deserving of continued support can exist without 
an adequate theory of justice.  This paper is about the elaboration of a theory of 
justice to underpin international economic law and international economic 
institutions. A world trade constitution cannot credibly exist without a clear 
notion of justice upon which to base a consensus.  Despite attempts to describe 
a world trade “legal system” or constitution, no such system or constitution yet 
exists in a way credible to many people.  There is yet no consensus on the 
public reason underpinning the rules and the institutions.  Much of the anti-
globalization dissent, though sometimes unfocused and confused, seems 
bottomed on the basic notion that a legal system requires a theory of justice.  
Governments will never get their populaces to embrace international economic 
4 See, e.g., Pamuela Samuelson, “Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the 
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 
1999, 14: 519.
3law and institutions without a consensus on what is just in the international 
economic sphere.  Scholars and practitioners have expended great effort in 
improving our understanding of world trade rules and policies, but the 
normative dimensions of such inquiry seems incomplete without an underlying 
consensus of sufficiently wide scope on the reasons for the rules and policies.  
That the rules and policies now encroach upon areas of domestic regulation in 
sensitive policy areas serves to highlight the problem.  
Economic efficiency has been the benchmark often used to evaluate the 
merits of international economic agreements.  Economic efficiency is a 
commonly understood aspiration embedded in the idea of progressive 
liberalization; the progressiveness of liberalization is determined based on 
efficiency gains.  I have no qualms about economic efficiency.  I think it is a 
valuable tool and I think economists bring a very useful toolkit to the table.  I 
am not going to expend any effort in bashing economics because such bashing 
is wrongheaded.  I refocus away from economics, however, away from the 
efficiency versus distribution dimensions of conceptualizing the effects of 
international economic institutions.  I devote this paper to examining 
approaches to understanding the allocation of resources that most economists 
are unwilling to devote much energy analyzing.   I have nothing against 
economics, but I do not see how we can base a constitutional system solely on 
it.  None in fact is.  Politicians really are not that interested in efficiency.  Why 
should efficiency be the default rule?  Not everyone accepts it.
One of the questions I explore is Kantian in influence: is there a 
constructivist procedure that is both universal and cosmopolitan, that we can 
apply to understand international economic agreements better – to improve our 
deliberation about the WTO and to develop a consensus on what is and is not 
acceptable?   This paper is located firmly in moral philosophy and hangs 
closely to deontological approaches to moral philosophy.  No “critical” or 
postmodern approaches are undertaken.  Banned are trendy left theories from 
these pages.5
The paper examines alternatives to the question of what should be a proper 
distributional framework for the design of international economic treaties and 
institutions. There are many standards, intended primarily for application to 
nation-states but extended here to global society.  In this paper, I discuss two 
approaches, those of John Rawls and T.M. Scanlon, with the focus primarily 
on Scanlon’s work.  The natural starting point for any discussion of moral 
theory in the context of social institutions is Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.6  I 
will not spend a great deal of time on Rawls, though he offers the most 
5
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4influential account.7  I cannot avoid Rawls.  Rawls wrote the most influential 
piece of moral philosophy in the twentieth century.  His A Theory of Justice
must form a base to discuss a cousin theory that has gained a good deal of 
recent popularity, the contractualist account of T.M. Scanlon, the most recent 
elaboration of which is in Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other.8
We could focus on other theories.  I would have to write a book rather than 
a paper if I were to exhaustively survey theories in competition with Rawls’s 
theory of justice, but it is worth at least brief mention of a few.  Amartya Sen 
and Martha Nussbaum propose that governments should maximize people’s 
basic capabilities.9  To Sen and Nussbaum, some goods are inputs needed to 
function in society.  They propose that governments equalize the ability to 
function in a society.  The capabilities approach has had some influence on the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which in 1993 began to 
assess quality of life using the concept of people’s capabilities.10  Ronald 
Dworkin argues that there should be equality of basic resources available to 
persons, with a mechanism for valuing nontransferable resources (such as 
native talent) in terms of transferable resources.11  Gerard Cohen argues for 
equalizing access to advantage.12  I could go on with this list.  Let me mention 
just one more because her theory will get lots of play in the coming years.  
Susan Hurley articulates a cognitivist theory of distributive justice, which aims 
to neutralize bias, to develop greater public agreement on what is good.13
Hurley’s idea of cognitive theory focuses on the meta-ethics of justice 
concepts.  She wants to solve the problem of the divide between private and 
public reason that Rawls deals with in Political Liberalism.14
7
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5I do not discuss rules in a comprehensive way, though I do “apply” the 
tools set forth in this paper to one persistent problem – the regulation of 
intellectual property rights at the WTO level and access to pharmaceuticals in 
low-income countries.  Rules are very important.  Nevertheless, I do not think 
this project is at the stage yet where I can offer systematic applications of the 
decision procedures set forth in this paper.  At most, one could say that this 
paper is about what lawyers call policies about rules.  The focus is on how to 
evaluate whether a rule is desirable or not based on an underlying value.  This 
paper is representative of a project, one to articulate philosophical thought 
about justice for application in the future, perhaps to compare with efficiency 
results.   Looking at theories of justice seems required if governments are to 
come up with meaningful cross-cultural comparisons of quality of life.  What 
are the norms for evaluating the so-called constitutional order?  We cannot 
claim to have a constitutional order without understanding what that order is 
based upon.  It is difficult to have a conversation about global injustice without 
common standards. 
So many ways of approaching this project exist that undoubtedly I am open 
to criticism for failing to address something.  I have been very selective in this 
paper.  Some may see as a glaring omission that I am not expending much 
effort discussing human rights.  Others have said much more about human 
rights that I can say.  For discussions from the perspective of philosophy see 
publications by Pogge15 and Habermas,16 and from the perspective of a 
philosophically informed legal scholar see publications by Petersmann.17  If 
this is a weakness in my approach, it is one shared with others.   Onora 
O’Neill, for example, a prominent Kantian, in her important work on justice 
explains that “[t]he most significant structures of ethical concern can be 
expressed in linked webs of requirements, which are better articulated by 
beginning from the perspective of agents and their obligations rather than that 
of claimants and their rights.”18  The idea here is that “there can be 
15 See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities,” in De Greiff & 
Cronin, 151-95.
16 See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, On Legitimation Through Human Rights, in De Greiff & 
Cronin, 197-214.
17 See, e.g., Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, “The WTO Constitution and Human Rights,” Journal of 
International Economic Law  3 (2000): 19-25; Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, “Human Rights and 
International Economic Law in the Twenty-First Century: The Need to Clarify Their 
Relationship,” Journal of International Economic Law 4 (2001): 3-39; Ernst Ulrich 
Petersmann, “From Negative to Positive Integration in the WTO: Time for ‘Mainstreaming 
Human Rights’ into WTO Law?,” Common Market Law Review 37 (2000): 1363-82. 
18
 Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning 
(Cambridge University Press 1996): 4.
6requirements on us that no one has any standing to require of us.”19  Whether 
we want to “legalize” these requirements to produce legally binding 
obligations, so that someone has such standing in the courts, is a question for 
policy makers informed by the standards found in this and in other works.
II. Rule Orientation and Implications for Fairness
One of the most significant achievements of the Uruguay Round was the 
negotiation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  The DSU creates 
the rules and the institutions for binding settlement of disputes relating to 
WTO agreements between or among WTO members.  The DSU by its own 
terms, explains that “[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central 
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system.”20  The DSU is an important stage in the evolution of the world trading 
system towards legalism, in which “legalist” approaches to dispute settlement 
in the world trading system evolve from “pragmatist” approaches, based 
primarily in diplomacy.21  Some contend that there is a move towards 
legalization in the international sphere generally, and that the WTO is one 
good example of this trend.22
Jackson’s rule-versus-power orientation is one of the most important and 
well-known insights in the literature on world trade law.23  In making this 
distinction Jackson, a careful scholar, made few claims about the justice of the 
rules.  He does not say that the WTO agreements and institutions constitute a 
legal system.  But he opened the way for thinking about whether the WTO is 
actually a legal system.  Some scholars claim that the WTO system is 
constitutional, that a “world trade constitution” exists.24  Others, relying on 
positivist notions of the law found in Hart and even in Austin, make claims 
about the existence of a world trade legal system.25
19
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22 Ibid.; Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 
Legalization and World Politics (MIT Press 2001).
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7Two kinds of theories about the international legal order are influential in 
the present day: positivist and instrumental.  Both these theories maintain 
longstanding relationships going back to Bentham, who was both a positivist 
and a utilitarian.  Both approaches fail to provide adequate accounts of justice.  
Positivism is obsessed with the pedigree of rules.  In its exclusive form, it 
requires the separation of law and morality and in its inclusive form; it denies 
any necessary connection between law and morality but admits that a 
connection between law and morality is possible.  Clearly, positivism does not 
require any moral criteria to assess the pedigree of legal rules.  
Instrumentalists, most notably law and economics scholars, argue that concepts 
of justice are rhetorical.  Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith, for example, argue 
that states use “moralistic and legalistic rhetoric” to advance their own 
interests.26  Why this rhetoric (if it is rhetoric) is less helpful in furthering our 
understanding than the metaphors of game theory, such as “cheap talk” and 
“signaling” is for another paper, but what the law and economics approach 
fails to identify is their longstanding connection to a discredited Benthamism.  
Law and economics scholars make the same arguments about justice that 
Bentham did in the eighteenth century.  In The Principles of Morals and 
Legislation," Bentham explains in a footnote that “justice, in the only sense in 
which it has a meaning, is an imaginary personage, feigned for the 
convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the dictates of utility, applied to 
certain particular cases. Justice, then, is nothing more than an imaginary 
instrument, employed to forward on certain occasions, and by certain means, 
the purposes of benevolence."27  In The Theory of Legislation, Bentham says 
that he uses the words "just" and "unjust" along with other words "simply as 
collective terms including the ideas of certain pains or pleasures."28
One of the major defects that positivism and instrumentalism share is that 
if we assume that they provide adequate accounts for legal principles, either in 
pedigree or in rational choice, then they produce bad counterexamples.  It is 
easy to come up with a system of positivistic and efficient rules that are unjust.  
Justice simply is not a criterion in these accounts.  
26
 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, “Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: 
A Rational Choice Perspective,” http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=250042; see also 
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2005).
27
 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, J.H. Burns, 
H.L.A. Hart & F. Rosen eds. (Oxford University Press rev. ed 1970 ed. 1996) ch. x, footnote 2 
to section XL.
28
 Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation C. K. Ogden ed. (London, 1931):. 3.  These 
references are discussed in John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” a 1958 paper appearing in the 
Philosophical Review, and now reprinted in John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman 
ed. (Harvard University Press 1999): 48-49.
8These two prevailing accounts of international economic law, then, 
positivism and instrumentalism, when combined with concepts from both the 
normative welfare economics of international trade and from the political 
economy of international trade, produce a quasi-utilitarian framework for the 
assessment of international economic law and institutions.29  Quasi-
utilitarianism is, it seems, is the default principle.  I use the term quasi-
utilitarianism because economics is distinct from utilitarianism, particularly 
from the Millian version of utilitarianism, and because I do not think there is 
an explicit recognition of utilitarianism as the actual reasons for action in the 
making of international economic law and policy.
Quasi-utilitarianism has so many problems that I do not know where to 
begin. Distinguishing other ethical theories from utilitarianism and the broader 
notion of consequentialism has been one of the major debating tournaments of 
modern moral philosophy and others far more capable than I have dealt with 
the issues in depth.  I mention just a few weaknesses of utilitarianism here, 
relevant to international economic law and policy.  How does quasi-
utilitarianism work?  The problems are in average utility, the greatest good for 
the greatest number, and in concepts like Pareto efficiency.  These measures 
fail to account for effects on the worst off.  They focus wholly on states of 
affairs and not on principles.  Quasi-utilitarianism tends to engage in an 
improper aggregation of the effect of a policy into a single judgment, giving 
inadequate attention to the distributive effects of the policy.  Aggregation tends 
to disguise the adverse effects of a policy on groups who suffer substantial 
burdens or who may be worse off in the society in question.30  Quasi-
utilitarianism does not deal with the basic problems of desert and luck - that 
the well-being of people depends on the natural lottery and on social and 
historic circumstances.  Joseph Raz has provided the example of how an act 
utilitarian must commit to the claim that an extra lick of ice cream for a 
sufficiently large number of people can justify the killing of another person, if 
the trivial satisfactions of the many that get the extra licks outweigh the loss 
suffered by the person killed.31  Utilitarian and quasi-utilitarian concepts do not 
link to concepts humans seem to possess of right and wrong.  It is telling that 
we do not teach our children to be utilitarian, but rather, we try to instill in 
them the reason-giving force of right and wrong.
29
 I borrow the “quasi-utilitarianism phrase from Carl Cranor, “The Genomic Revolution and 
Intra-National and Inter-National Equity (unpub., on file with the author).
30 Ibid.
31
 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press 1988).
9III. Fairness Theories
My project is to set forth some alternatives to the current default rule of 
quasi-utilitarianism, so that we may better understand the fairness of 
international economic law and institutions.  As explained above, the natural 
starting point for any such discussion is Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.  I will not 
spend a great deal of time on Rawls, because others have covered Rawls so 
well, and I want to move on to the more recent work of Scanlon.  Before I take 
on the substantive accounts, some groundwork is necessary.
At the outset, we must be cautious in extending contractualism to provide 
an account of public morality.  Scanlon explains that contractualism applies 
only to individual conduct.32  It is intended for application to the basic question 
that moral philosophers try to answer, and that is “how should one live.”  The 
focus of inquiry in contractualism is thus plainly distinguishable from that of 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, which has as its explicit target an account of a 
public morality.  Rawls elaborates in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, that 
his principles concern “the basic structure of society, that is, its main political 
and social institutions and how they fit together into one unified system of 
social cooperation.”33  Considerable problems may appear in trying to extend 
contractualism from the private to the public sphere, but considerable promise 
exists in such an extension nonetheless.  We will have to work out these 
problems or contractualism ultimately will not make the move into the political 
and legal realms.
      The theories that I discuss all deal in concepts about principles.  They do 
not focus solely on states of affairs, as economics, utilitarianism and other 
forms of consequentialism do.  Both Rawls and Scanlon blend the two values.  
They permit a focus on states of affairs, but states of affairs cannot trump 
principles of fairness.  Neither theorist is neutral about principles.  Scanlon 
starts his hugely influential work on contractualism with an account that places 
his theory within descriptivism, but with little in the way of the metaphysical 
baggage often associated with such discussion.34
Rawls’s work is constructivist.  Rawls did not use that term in A Theory of 
Justice.  In A Theory of Justice, he does discuss the idea of construction, that 
his principles of justice provide “constructive criteria” for guiding action.35
Rawls distinguishes constructivist from intuitionist approaches.  He argues that 
intuitionism produces a set of impractical and unranked moral principles and 
32
 Scanlon, 228. 
33
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Erin Kelly ed. (Harvard University Press 
2001): 39-40.
34
 Scanlon, 2
35
 Onora O’Neill, “Constructivism versus Contractualism, Ratio 2003, 16: 319-31.
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thus does not help to guide action.36  Thus, the major distinction is between 
constructivism and realism.37  In a constructivist moral theory, moral principles 
are not “furniture of the universe.”38  They are not facts independent of and 
prior to moral reasoning.  They however, have validity and are correct when 
they are the product of a procedure in which a human agent engages in
practical reason to articulate and live by a moral principle.  In his Lectures on 
the History of Modern Moral Philosophy, Rawls explains that Kant is a 
constructivist.  “An essential feature of Kant’s moral constructivism is that the 
particular categorical imperatives that give the content of the duties of justice 
and virtue are viewed as specified by a procedure of construction (the CI 
procedure). . . .”39  Constructivists do not have to be Kantian.  Utilitarians are 
constructivists, as is the neo-Hobbsian David Gauthier.40  Rawls is a Kantian 
constructivist.  In his 1980 Dewey Lecture, entitled “Kantian Constuctivism in 
Moral Theory,” Rawls “set out more clearly the Kantian roots of A Theory of 
Justice”  and to elaborate more clearly the Kantian form of constructivism.41
Rawls is also a contractualist.  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls places his 
work within the social contract tradition of Kant, Locke and Rousseau.42
Scanlon places his work in the tradition of Rousseau.43  O’Neill argues that we 
can read Scanlon to be a constructivist.44  To avoid confusion, I use the 
contractualist label to refer to Scanlon and the constructivist label to refer to 
Rawls.  
A. Rawls: Kantian Constructivism
A threshold question is whether we can apply Rawlsian justice as fairness 
outside of the confines of domestic society.  Rawls himself refused to extend 
his theory to international contexts, but many Rawlsians have argued that the 
conditions now hold for application of Rawlsian theory at the international 
36
 O’Neill, “Constructivism versus Contractualism.”  Rawls makes the same distinctions about 
Kant.  Lectures on the History of Modern Moral Philosophy, Barbara Herman ed. (Harvard 
University Press 2000): 237-38.
37
 I use the word “realism” in its philosophical sense and not as used in legal thought to refer to 
legal realism. The two theories are radically different.
38 See John L. Mackie, Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin reprint ed. 1991).
39
 Rawls, Lectures, 237.
40
 O’Neill, “Constructivism Versus Contractualism, 320, David Gauthier, Morals by 
Agreement (Oxford University Press reprint ed. 1987).
41
 Rawls, Lectures, xiii.
42
 Rawls, Theory of Justice, section 3; xviii.
43
 Scanlon, 5.
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 O’Neill, “Constructivism Versus Contractualism.”
11
level.  I will not restate those arguments here.45  The extension is justified 
because of the lack of economic self-sufficiency and distributional autonomy 
between states.46  The WTO and other international economic institutions no 
doubt had a hand in bringing these two conditions into existence.  
The Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness is about social justice or public 
morality.  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explains that the “primary subject” of 
his principles is “the basic structure of society, the arrangement of social 
institutions into one scheme of cooperation.”47  Rawls elaborates in Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement, that his principles concern “the basic structure of 
society, that is, its main political and social institutions and how they fit 
together into one unified system of social cooperation.”48  These principles, 
Rawls continues, “are to govern the assignment of rights and duties in these 
institutions and they are to determine the appropriate distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of social life.”49  They “must not be confused with the 
principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular 
circumstances.”50
The basic structure of the Rawlsian conception of justice is that if mutually 
self-interested and rational persons stand in relation to each other behind a veil 
of ignorance in the original position, and if they must choose a conception of 
the right to order their claims on society in the circumstances of justice, they 
will agree on two lexically ordered principles of justice.  The first principle of 
justice is that society guarantees each person an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others.  The second principle of justice is that society should 
arrange social and economic inequalities so that two criteria are met: (1) 
positions and offices should be open to everyone equally; and (2) social and 
economic inequalities should benefit everyone regardless of social group.51
The focus in discussions of global economic questions has mainly been on 
the second principle, which has clear implications for assessing the distributive 
justice of international economic law and institutions.  I like others place less 
emphasis on the first principle, so we do not have to get into the question of 
public reason on mainly non-economic civil society issues to any great depth.  
The first principle, dealing with basic liberties and freedoms, goes to the heart 
of sovereignty.  It is the subject of domestic constitutional orders, but also of 
45 See Garcia; Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundation 
of International Law (Oxford University Press 2004); Pogges.
46
 Garcia; Buchanan, 200-27.
47
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 47.
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 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 39-40.
49
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice 3.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 60.  I am grateful to Carl Cranor for input on the basic structure of the argument. Carl 
Cranor, “Rawlsian Choice of Distributive Principles” (unpub., on file with the author).
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international human rights and international criminal law regimes.  As these 
international regimes proliferate, some of the responsibilities for securing the 
first principle move to the international level.  That is not my concern here.  
That the first trumps the second is important for understanding why we should 
not lightly allow international legal orders to override fair domestic legal 
orders.  The first principle retains its lexical priority institutionally to the extent 
that governments refuse to agree to treaties that derogate from basic rights and 
freedoms provided domestically.  Difficulties may arise, however, if 
international tribunals, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, issue 
decisions that trump basic rights granted domestically.  This is an issue for 
another paper. 
Let us look a bit more closely at the second principle.  Rawls contends that 
if we place persons behind a veil of ignorance in the original position, they 
would choose the difference and fair equality of opportunity principles as 
principles of equality.  At the risk of oversimplifying, the reason for the 
selection of these principles in the original position is because Rawls does not 
want to base the distribution of primary social goods (rights, liberties, 
opportunities, income and wealth) or primary natural goods (health, 
intelligence and imagination) on initial endowments obtained through luck.  
When they are behind the veil of ignorance in the original position, people do 
not know their endowments of these goods.  
The second principle permits inequality, and persons can use their unequal 
endowments to their own benefit, as long as institutions provide incentives to 
benefit everyone, and in particular the worst off.  Let us unpack this second 
principle.  It itself contains two principles, the fair equality of opportunity 
principle and the difference principle.  
The fair equality of opportunity principle holds that positions and offices 
that result in social and economic inequalities must be open to all.  It does not 
assume or ensure that everyone is equal in talents, abilities and motivation.  
But, for individuals who are equal in talents, abilities and motivations, they 
should have an equal chance of attaining the same positions in a given society.  
Under the fair equality of opportunity principle, social and, in our context here, 
national starting points are irrelevant because they are arbitrary.
The difference principle essentially provides that inequality must benefit 
everyone.  As long as the primary social goods of the worst off group are 
increasing, inequality is fair and can continue to increase.  As soon as the 
primary social goods of the worst off group stop increasing, then the society in 
question has reached the maximum inequality permitted.  We can add other 
groups into this picture.  Suppose the welfare of the worst off group plateaus 
but society could continue to make the best off group (or any better off group) 
better off with no detriment to the worst off group.  Is such a move fair?  
Inequality can continue, but we have to examine the effects on other groups.  
Consider the second worst off group.  If during increasing inequality, the lot of 
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the second worst off group is increasing, so long as society does not make the 
worst off group even worse off, inequality can continue to increase.  The point 
at which increasing inequality must stop is at the point at which society could 
make no more moves without making the worst off group or the second worse 
off group even more badly off.  We can generalize the account to n groups.  
The emerging concept is the difference principle: A scheme of cooperation is 
fair if, in the given historical and social circumstances, society can make no 
further move that would make all (every one) of the representative groups 
better off.52  In other words, pick a regime of norms that makes everyone better 
off than they would be under any other regime of norms.
Rawls’s theory of justice combines two prevailing approaches to moral 
theory.  It is principled.  It has a procedure of construction for determining the 
content of fairness. The veil of ignorance and original position is a 
universalizing procedure, as is Kant’s categorical imperative procedure.  Rawls 
uses principles to evaluate states of affairs.  His theory is a hybrid.  Rawls does
not rely solely on the analysis of states of affairs, as utilitarianism does, but 
states of affairs surely are important in assessing the lot of groups in society, 
particularly the worst off.  As we shall see in the following part, Scanlon’s 
contractualism shares this hybrid feature.
The relevance of Rawls’s theory of justice to the normativity of 
international economic law and institutions is remarkable.  It is no wondering 
that so many have extended Rawls to the international realm.  
B. Scanlon: Contractualism
In 1982, T. M. Scanlon published an influential paper entitled 
“Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in which he first proposed his 
contractualist account of morality.53  He since wrote a book on contractualism, 
What We Owe to Each Other, which revised some of his views, partly in 
response to critics.54  Contractualism has gotten quite a bit of attention in moral 
philosophical circles, and it is worth investigating its application to institutions.  
I will not present anything like a complete account of contractualism here.  I 
want to get to the structure of the contractualist argument, to understand its 
application.  The meta-ethical, epistemological and metaphysical questions are 
for discussion in other venues.  Despite the lack of a link to the political realm, 
I think the best use of contractualism is as a heuristic for evaluating global 
economic treaties.  Contractualism is an ethical framework that has the 
52
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potential to produce increased attention to fairness in the global economic 
order.
Scanlon states the basic working principle of contractualism as follows: 
“an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that 
no one could reasonably reject as the basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement.”55  Scanlon prefers the negative formulation to the affirmative “that 
everyone could reasonably accept” because “unanimous acceptance is a 
consequence of this condition’s being fulfilled, but is not itself the basic 
idea.”56  Scanlon did not intend to formulate anything like a Pareto optimality 
requirement.  Cohen has argued that an equivalent formulation for “no one 
could reasonably reject” would be “everyone must reasonably accept.”57
Arguably, these phrases are equivalent, but it is best to use the phrase adopted 
by Scanlon, since it is his theory.
In contractualism, the basis for moral wrongness or rightness lies in mutual 
recognition, a kind of mutuality.  Mutual recognition lies in the motivational 
basis for contractualism.  Scanlon’s contractualism is not Hobbsian.  People do 
not enter into agreement out of any reasons of self-interest.58  Scanlon 
explains:
What distinguishes my view from other accounts involving 
ideas of agreement is its conception of the motivational basis of 
this agreement.  The parties whose agreement is in question are 
assumed not merely to be seeking some kind of advantage but 
also to be moved by the aim of finding principles that others, 
similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject.59
Contractualism reflects the “idea of a shared willingness to modify our private 
demands in order to find a basis of justification that others also have reason to 
accept.”60  The philosophical lineage of Scanlon’s contractualism goes back to 
Rousseau, not Hobbes.61
A key aspect of Scanlon’s contractualism is its justification requirement.  
Justification is necessary to his theory in two ways: first as a normative basis 
for determining the content of morality – for determining right and wrong –
and second as a way of characterizing that content.  The focus of 
characterization is in something like a constructivist procedure, in determining 
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rightness or wrongness based on justification to others.62  In this sense, 
Scanlonian contractualism does not need a veil of ignorance.  The veil is 
unnecessary because contractualism internalizes the requirement of 
justifiability in the reasonable rejection standard.  The concept of avoiding a 
bias of self-interest exists in the requirement of taking action that others could 
not reasonably reject.  The motivational basis for the reasonable rejection 
requirement already requires that agents consider others.  Scanlon does not 
need to impose a veil of ignorance requirement in order to get to the point 
where people will be other-regarding.63  The lack of connection to Hobbes 
seems clear.
Contractualism accounts for morality in a narrow sense.  It does not 
concern morality in a broader sense, where it has to do with a range of issues 
of individual moral conduct that do no harm or violate any duties to others.64
For example, contractualism does no work towards helping us understand 
whether harming the environment in and of itself is morally wrong.  Its scope 
is limited to a narrower range of morality, with duties we owe to others.  Harm 
to the environment is a value to the extent it is, within a reasonable rejection 
framework, harm to others.  Reasons for rejection are personal, but their force 
as reasons may depend on impersonal value, say, if people are of the view, that 
protection of the environment is worthwhile.65  Scanlon argues that 
contractualism nevertheless applies to a broader range of human action than 
justice does, because justice has to do with social institutions.66  His 
interpretation of justice as outside the realm of the practical reason of 
individual agents seems questionable, but I think he is simply trying to cabin 
contractualism as something that applies to individual or private 
circumstances.
Scanlon provides guidance on the form of a contractualist argument. 
Consider the situation in which an agent must determine whether it is wrong to 
do X in circumstances C.  First, “deciding whether an action is right or wrong 
requires a substantive judgment on our part about whether certain objections to 
possible moral principles would be reasonable.”67  From here, we must look at 
burdens and benefits.  To determine what is reasonably rejectable by others, 
“we . . . need to form an idea of the burdens that would be imposed on some 
people in such a situation if others were permitted to do X.”68  Scanlon calls 
these “objections to permission.”69  We must compare objections to permission 
62 Ibid., 189.
63 Ibid., 207.
64 Ibid., 6-7.
65 Ibid., 220.
66 Ibid.
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68 Ibid., 195.
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to “objections to prohibition,” which focus on benefits to others.70  We then 
can compare these two sorts of objections to derive a judgment about whether 
X is morally permissible.  Scanlon explains:
If the objections to permission are strong enough, compared to 
the objections to prohibition, to make it reasonable to reject any 
principle permitting doing X in C, then one would not expect 
the objections to prohibition to be strong enough, compared to 
the objections to permission, to make it reasonable to reject any 
principle that forbids doing X in C.71
In contractualism, objections derive from principles, not merely from 
effects or states of affairs.  This does not mean that principles cannot take 
states of affairs into account.  The degree of harm a principle causes is directly 
relevant to its fairness.  Contractualism, however, does not focus solely on 
states of affairs; principles guide any consideration of states of affairs.  The 
focus is on why an action is wrong.  Reasons are thus paramount.  This sort of 
thinking should not be exceptional to lawyers.  For example, we would 
consider accidental harm different from intentional harm, even if the effects 
were the same.  In determining whether to build a road or a school or an 
electrical transmitter, we accept the non-negligent injury or even death of a 
limited number of workers and possibly bystanders as socially acceptable risk.  
We can even determine with some degree of statistical confidence that such 
injuries or deaths will occur.  On the other hand, the law does not accept 
intentional harm inflicted on a few people so that many will benefit.  Scanlon 
offers the example of electrical equipment falling on the arm of a worker in a 
transmitter room of a television station broadcasting a World Cup match. We 
certainly would not sanction the failure to remove the worker from harm in 
order to continue the broadcast.  We would want to rescue her before the match 
is over.72
We can understand the nature of objections to permission and prohibition is 
in what Derek Parfit’s characterization of Scanlonian contractualism as a 
“Complaint Model” of ethical decision-making.73  In such a model, only 
individuals can raise objections, which means that there can be no aggregation 
or summing of costs and benefits, because such aggregation or summing can 
result in the burdening of some groups to benefit others.  Scanlon explains:
A contractualist theory, in which all objections to a principle 
must be raised by individuals, blocks such justifications in an 
intuitively appealing way.  It allows the intuitively compelling 
complaints of those who are severely burdened to be heard, 
70
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while, on the other side, the sum of the smaller benefits to 
others has no justificatory weight, since there is no individual 
who enjoys those benefits and would have to forgo them if the 
policy were disallowed.74
Utilitarianism permits aggregation, but contractualism does not, except in a 
very narrow range of circumstances involving “ties.”  A tie is a situation in 
which the moral seriousness of, say, two states of affairs is equivalent, but one 
situation involves harm to more people than the other does.  In such a situation, 
it is permissible to choose the alternative that causes harm to the fewer number 
of persons.  In situations not involving ties, which Scanlon seems to think are 
the overwhelming majority of situations, we must look to principles to choose 
the appropriate course of action.75
Scanlon gives us some hint on how we could apply his contractualist 
principle to questions about global justice.   In a section of his book on whether 
there should be a priority for the worst off, Scanlon elaborates two principles, 
the Rescue Principle and the Principle of Helpfulness.76  Both have as their 
scope the question whether a duty to render aid exists.  Aid rendering duties 
have been the subject of longstanding questions of Kantians, consequentialists 
and virtue ethicists. The basic point of discussion is, how other-regarding 
should I be?  Do I have to depart from my own life projects to aid others?  Can 
I consider my own interests?  
Scanlon contends that in some cases the question of priority never arises.77
His example is the obligation to keep a promise, a subject he devotes a good 
bit of discussion to in his book.  Therefore, as a preliminary matter, it seems 
contractualism will excuse from the discussion of distributive justice any pre-
existing obligations.  Scanlon does not say much about this limitation.  It has 
the potential to be a very significant limitation and is worthy of future 
exploration.
Scanlon says that a principle of priority for the worst off “has greater 
plausibility when we turn from principles whose aim is to create some specific 
form of protection or assurance to principles which tell us how we should 
distribute some transferable good, in cases in which the value of this good to 
potential beneficiaries is the dominant consideration.”78   The cases in which it 
is most clearly wrong not to give aid are cases in which others are in serious 
difficulties, where their lives are immediately threatened, they are starving, in 
great pain, or “living in conditions of bare subsistence.”79  He articulates his 
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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Rescue Principle for these cases: “if you are presented with a situation in 
which you can prevent something very bad from happening, or alleviate 
someone’s dire plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, 
then it would be wrong not to do so.”80  Thus, it would be unreasonable for me 
to reject a moral duty to give a charitable contribution to the victims of the 
recent tsunami.  The Principle of Helpfulness, on the other hand, applies when 
someone else not in dire need would benefit from my help, and my help would 
mean a slight to moderate sacrifice on my part.  
Do these principles seem weak?  They try to steer away from the problem 
faced by moral (but not legal) utilitarianism that it asks too much of agents.  
Scanlon allows us to consider our own life plans.  Scanlon argues that it would 
be reasonable to reject a principle requiring us to give no more weight to our 
own interests than to the “similar interests” of others.81  He explains, “what is 
appealed to is not the weight of my interests or yours but rather the generic 
reasons that everyone in the position of the agent has for not wanting to be 
bound, in general, by such a strict requirement.”82
Of course, we must be fair to Scanlon here.  His discussion is limited to the 
question of whether individuals – not governments – have a duty to render aid.  
The public international analogue is aid and development assistance, though 
we should not jump to the analogy without providing proper reasons for the 
extension of contractualism from the private to the public sphere.  We cannot 
suggest his principles as anything other than heuristics for evaluation of WTO 
(or other) policies and institutions without some account of how contractualism 
is a public form of morality, something of sufficiently broad scope that it is the 
subject for another paper.  The most glaring omission in contractualism as it 
stands now is a theory of justice about public institutions.  The bottom line for 
contractualism is that, in contrast to Rawls’s theory of justice, a “priority of the 
worst off” is a “feature of certain particular moral contexts rather than a 
general structural feature of contractualist moral argument.”83   Scanlon admits 
that such a priority is a central feature of Rawls’s difference principle, but he is 
careful to explain that while Rawls starts from the idea that equal participants 
in a fair system of social cooperation have a prima facie claim to an equal 
share in the benefits it creates.  In his constructivist account, Rawls tries to 
neutralize luck created in the natural lottery of birth, nationality and so on.  
Contractualism, lacking a political idea of equality, makes no claims about 
equality or initial endowments.  
Do we want to extend contractualism into the public realm, to evaluate in 
our particular case the fairness of global economic treaties?  Some scholars, 
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 225.
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such as Leif Wenar, contend that contractualism is adequate but that the main 
task of the contractualist is empirical and not philosophical.  He argues that “if 
the causal links are good – that if, if rich individuals can in fact improve the 
long-term well-being of the poor and their descendants through direct action 
with their time and money - then contractualism may place on rich individuals 
quite significant demands.”84   Wenar’s argument is good as far as it goes for 
the construction of a moral principle in the realm of private morality, but I 
believe that we need to do more work to get an adequate account of 
contractualism to compare with Rawls’s theory of justice.  For now, we can 
use Scanlon’s principles as heuristics. 
IV. A Sketch of How to Apply Fairness Criteria: TRIPs and Access to 
Medicines
In his article, “Global Economics and International Economic Law,” 
Jackson explains that “[d]istributive justice suggests a variety of policies 
within the scope of a domestic market: progressive taxation, welfare, safety 
nets, a social market economy, etc.  But, internationally, of course, we have 
this problem also: the low income countries argue for certain preferences.”85
Garcia has done important work on the application of Rawlsian principles of 
fairness to special and differential treatment.86  The next steps are to evaluate 
the basic policies and normative structures in the WTO agreements and 
international economic institutions generally.  
As for normative structures, a place to start is in understanding the fairness 
of the most basic of the traditional tools of the trade lawyer – national 
treatment and most favored nation (MFN) obligations.  When is national 
treatment or MFN reasonably rejectable by a WTO member?  Quotas are also 
an obvious target of analysis.  From these basic disciplines, we could move to 
examining non-tariff barriers to trade and areas of substantive regulation.  
TRIPs and the Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement seem apt for some sort 
of contractualist analysis.  Subsidies is another area in which a fairness 
analysis could tell us much.  The recent Upland Cotton decision, in which the 
WTO Appellate Body, upheld a ruling by a dispute settlement panel that U.S. 
subsidies to cotton farmers in part violated the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement and distorted trade, suggests a subject for further inquiry 
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using Scanlonian or Rawlsian principles.87  We could assess the fairness the 
WTO dispute settlement process itself using these principles.  We could gain 
insights by using the tools of moral philosophy to understand, for example, the 
effects of dispute settlement policies on low-income countries or on 
inadequately represented groups.  In addition to the need for a philosophical 
account to transition Scanlon (and other) ethical theories to conceptions of 
political justice, the next steps are empirical: institutionally oriented studies of 
the details of the world trading system.
As an example, I examine the effect of TRIPs on access to medicines in
low-income countries.  The subject of access to medicines has received a good 
deal of attention.  The attention focuses on the devastation that disease has 
brought to the low-income countries, particularly countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Intellectual property rights are but one feature of the global health 
delivery system, one that is isolable and relates directly to the work of the 
WTO.  
The link between poverty, poor health and access to medicines is 
indisputable.  According to a report written by economist Jeffrey Sachs for the 
World Health Organization, “[t]he linkages of health to poverty reduction and 
to long-term economic growth are powerful, much stronger than is generally 
understood.  The burden of disease in some low-income regions, especially
sub-Saharan Africa, stands as a stark barrier to economic growth . . . .”88   The 
main causes of avoidable deaths in the least developed countries are the result 
of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, childhood infectious diseases, maternal 
and perinatal conditions, deficiencies in nutrition and illness related to tobacco 
use.  Many of these diseases are preventable or curable.  Sachs estimates that if 
developed countries were to allocate only 0.1 percent of their GNP to 
assistance in health care, they could save 8 million lives per year in the low-
income countries.89   Sachs explains:
This program would yield economic benefits vastly greater than 
its costs.  Eight million lives saved from infectious diseases and 
nutritional deficiencies would translate into a far larger number 
of years of life saved for those affected, as well as higher 
quality of life.  Economists talk of disability-adjusted life years 
(DALYs) saved, which add together the increased years of life 
and the reduced years of living with disabilities.  We estimate 
that approximately 330 million DALYs would be saved for each 
8 million deaths prevented.  Assuming, conservatively, that 
87
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each DALY saved gives an economic benefit of 1 year’s per 
capita income of a projected $563 in 2015, the direct economic 
benefit of saving 330 million DALYs would be $186 billion per 
year, and plausibly several times that.  Economic growth would 
also accelerate, and thereby the saved DALYs would help to 
break the poverty trap that has blocked economic growth in 
high-mortality low income countries.  This would add tens or 
hundreds of billions of dollars more per year through increased 
per capita incomes.90
Malaria, a preventable disease, all but eradicated in the North, continues to 
plague the South and correlates strongly to poverty and poor economic 
growth.91
Some consider access to medicines a human right.  The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the World Health Organization accept 
this approach.92  Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights recognizes “[t]he right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”93  Rights arguments 
are fatally imprecise because they tell us nothing about obligations and 
requirements, and of course, intellectual property rights holders have rights 
that may conflict with the nebulous human right to health.  Rights talk has 
gotten us little.  These rights are either unenforceable or inapplicable.  The 
international human rights covenants require countries that ratify them to 
conform their domestic laws to the covenants.  Countries do not have to ratify 
these covenants.  Indeed, the United States has not ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Some countries, such as 
the United States, will not ratify a human rights covenant unless its laws 
already conform to the covenant, i.e., unless the covenant conforms to 
domestic law.  Even if a country ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it would impose no obligations on the 
country to improve access to health care in other countries.  These weak 
human rights regimes contrast starkly to the strong intellectual property rights 
protection in TRIPs, mandatory if a country is a WTO member.  TRIPs is a 
multilateral agreement; all WTO members must comply, though low-income 
countries had more time to achieve compliance as a result of transition periods 
contained in TRIPs.  I show below how rights arguments go wrong and how an 
alternative formulation, one based on requirements and obligations, might 
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work.  Whether obligations on one person or set of persons gives rights to 
others, I leave for future discussion.
A. TRIPS and the Doha Declaration
Property rights have been a prime area of controversy for several centuries.  
It would be difficult to challenge the argument that no other category of legal 
rules affects the distribution of wealth more than property rules.  Hume 
postulated as his central reason why people engage in society is for stability in 
the possession of property.94  His reason looks very much like what rational 
choice theorists characterize as a Nash equilibrium.  The political economics of 
British agriculture in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries worked to produce 
the enclosure movement in Britain, the so-called first enclosure movement, in 
which the monarchy enclosed commons areas, such as copyholds of the 
yeomanry, to expropriate the rights of small farmers in estates.95
While the battle in the first enclosure movement was over rights in 
agricultural land, the battle in the second enclosure movement is in rights over 
products of the mind, which includes pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.  The 
contested rights are in intangible property, intellectual property.96  Similes and 
metaphors abound in the literature.  We are in the process of the second 
enclosure movement the “enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind” 
and the “intellectual land grab.”97  The battle for rights in intellectual property 
is “an information arms race with multiple sides battling for larger shares of 
the global knowledge pool.”98  The enclosure of the intellectual commons is 
occurring in various disciplines of science and technology, including in 
information technology and cyberspace, and in biotechnology relating to 
pharmaceuticals, medicine and human genetics.
TRIPs is one of the most important international agreements relevant to the 
allocation of intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals.  Although an 
international trade agreement and not a domestic intellectual property law, 
TRIPS is relevant to the question of ownership of rights in pharmaceuticals.  It 
specifies standards for the intellectual property laws of the WTO members.  It 
is unlike any other trade agreement preceding it, unlike anything produced in 
the WTO framework since the GATT’s humble beginnings as an agreement to 
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regulate tariffs.  TRIPs harmonizes intellectual property protection at a high 
level of protection for rights holders, and this is one of its controversial 
characteristics.   
The WTO members negotiated TRIPs as part of the Uruguay Round and it 
was thus negotiated from 1986 to mid-1994.  It is one of the most important 
developments in the WTO regime.  TRIPs has been described as "the most 
ambitious international intellectual property convention ever attempted" and as 
"the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property."99  It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that in the Uruguay Round, multilateral 
co-operation in the WTO regime on intellectual property matters transformed 
from a casual indifference to an intense preference for rigorous standards.  
TRIPs does much more than impose the traditional WTO obligations of MFN 
and national treatment.  It is the first international trade agreement to specify 
minimum standards of protection and universal coverage of intellectual 
property rights.  It imposes positive obligations on WTO members to protect 
seven categories of intellectual property.100  The standards in TRIPs reflect the 
high standards of intellectual property protection typically found in the 
intellectual property laws of high-income countries.  In effect, TRIPS 
harmonizes intellectual property protection.  Low-income countries must meet 
the same standards as developed countries, although under the transition 
provisions of the Agreement, they had more time in which to achieve 
compliance with the Agreement.  Developed countries had until January 1, 
1996 to achieve compliance, developing countries until January 1, 2000, and 
least developed countries have until January 1, 2006.101  In addition to high 
substantive standards that all WTO members must follow, TRIPs mandates 
untried procedural requirements for enforcing intellectual property rights.  
TRIPs directs WTO members on the details of how their enforcement system 
is supposed to enforce intellectual property rights within their borders.102
Moreover, disputes between WTO members over compliance with TRIPs are 
decided in the WTO dispute settlement system.103
Two TRIPs provisions are especially relevant to the affordable medicines 
debate: those dealing with patents and those dealing with compulsory 
licensing.
TRIPs requires that WTO members make patents lasting for at least twenty 
years from the date of the filing of the patent application available for “all 
inventions, whether products or processes.”104  The pharmaceutical industry 
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was particularly interested in having TRIPs require that all WTO members 
protect product patents.  India, for example, has a long history of not 
recognizing product patents.  India is a low-income country with many 
individuals paying health care expenses out-of-pocket.  For many years India’s 
substantial pharmaceuticals industry, in 2002 the largest producer of generic 
drugs in terms of volume, focused on the reverse engineering of 
pharmaceuticals and in the production of inexpensive drugs for a low-income 
population.105  Drug prices were in India thousands of percent lower than the 
patent protecting prices in higher income countries.  To comply with TRIPs, 
India had to amend its patent law to recognize product patents.  In 2002, India 
amended its patent law to conform to TRIPs.  The Patents (Amendment) Act of 
2002, which went into effect in May 2003, recognizes twenty-year product 
patents on pharmaceuticals.106
Compulsory licensing is a concept known principally outside of the United 
States.  It is the license granted to produce a patented product over the 
objection of the patent holder. 107  The license may run either to a government 
or to a user the government authorizes.  TRIPs authorizes compulsory 
licensing but imposes a number of conditions.  Before undertaking compulsory 
licensing, a government must try, “over a reasonable period of time,” to 
negotiate “reasonable commercial terms” from the rights holder.108  A WTO 
member may waive these requirements in the event of a “national 
emergency.”109  Any use of the compulsory license must be “predominantly for 
the supply of the domestic market” of the WTO member.110  Finally, the right 
holder must be paid “adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, 
taking into account the economic value of the authorization.”111
The Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
requires that the WTO members hold ministerial conferences at least once 
every two years.112  A ministerial conference is the highest level of decision 
making in the WTO system.  The WTO members held the Doha Ministerial 
Conference in late 2001.  In that ministerial conference, the WTO members 
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agreed on November 14, 2001 to the “Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement 
and Public Health.” 113  The so-called “Doha Declaration” states that the WTO 
members “recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”114 and “stress the need” 
for TRIPs to be “part of the wider national and international action to address 
these problems.”115  On the other hand, the Declaration recognizes that 
“intellectual property protection is important for the development of new 
medicines,” and “the concerns about its effects on prices.”116  The WTO 
members agreed that TRIPS “does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking measures to protect public health,” and that TRIPS “can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right 
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.”117   The Declaration contains the following steps that are more concrete:
(1) “Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.”118
This section informs that compulsory licensing is a matter of national 
discretion.119
(2) “Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.”120  This section provides that the current 
health crises in the low-income countries are “national emergencies” and that 
negotiations with rights holders before issuing compulsory licenses is 
unnecessary.
(3) “The effect of the provisions in the TRIPs Agreement that are relevant 
to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to 
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to 
MFN and national treatment provisions. . . .”121  This provision provides that 
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WTO members may permit parallel imports so long as they are not 
discriminatory.122
(4) The last section of the Declaration, among other things, “reaffirm[s] the 
commitment of developed-country Members to provide incentives to their 
enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to 
least-developed country Members pursuant to Article 66.2”123
The Declaration left open for future work by the TRIPs Council the 
problem of lack of pharmaceutical manufacturing capability in some low 
income countries.124  Compulsory licensing would not be helpful towards 
alleviating public health crises in a country lacking the capability to produce 
drugs.  The TRIPs Council was required to report to the General Council by 
May 2002.  The outcome of this additional work is a Decision of the General 
Council of 30 August 2003, in which least developed countries and countries 
that notify the WTO of their lack of capability may import pharmaceutical 
products from eligible countries.  The conditions for such exporting and 
importing are strict.  I will not go into the details of the Decision here because 
they do not affect the analysis to follow.
B. Refocusing Towards Principles and Obligations
From an economic standpoint, it is widely held that strong global 
intellectual property rights have questionable welfare effects.  From an 
economic standpoint, TRIPs might be welfare reducing and rent shifting, with 
the rents shifting from the poor to the rich.  It is not at all clear that intellectual 
property rights are necessary for innovation.125  I will not spend time 
explaining these economic points, as others have spent a good deal of effort on 
them.  Add to these findings of normative welfare economists the findings of 
political economists, who argue that TRIPs is the product of industry 
capture,126 and we certainly have a questionable state of affairs even from an 
efficiency point of view.  
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Part of the problem is a poverty of discourse, stemming from the focus on 
property rights.  The contentious compulsory licensing permissions coming 
from Doha are an example of how property rights arguments skew the debate. 
We have to talk about derogations from those rights and go through all sorts of 
efforts to get derogations.  And, what if the pro-property rights lobby is right as 
to particular life-saving drugs?  What if the derogations, or some of them, harm 
innovation in particular cases?
An intellectual property rights regime by itself is an incomplete solution.  
Focusing also on obligations or requirements will allow for the stimulation of 
innovation while simultaneously providing for access to medicines in low-
income countries.
1. The Rawlsian Approach
Though this paper introduces a Scanlonian approach to examining the 
question of fairness of trade agreements, we should also take a brief look at 
how a Rawlsian approach might fare.  Let us apply Rawls’s second principle to 
the problems associated with intellectual property rights and affordable 
medicines.  This second principle itself contains two principles, the fair 
equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle.  We will not be 
able to come up with definitive answers because we need more empirical work, 
but we can put forth a framework for carrying on the analysis and reach 
tentative conclusions.
Here is how the analysis would proceed in determining whether TRIPs 
contravenes the fair equality of opportunity principle.  In the context of the 
substantial need for affordable medicines in the low-income countries, the first 
question is whether TRIPS results in or contributes to over-protection of 
intellectual property rights.  It results in overprotection to the extent that the 
rights that it creates and protects impair what Daniels calls normal species 
functioning.  According to Daniels, “impairments to normal species 
functioning reduce the range of opportunity we have within which to construct 
life-plans and conceptions of the good we have a reasonable expectation of 
finding satisfying or happiness-producing.”127  Daniels defines health care 
broadly.  He divides heath care needs into five categories: (1) adequate 
nutrition and shelter, (2) sanitary, safe and unpolluted living and working 
conditions; (3) “exercise, rest, and other features of healthy life-styles;” (4) 
“preventive, curative, and rehabilitative personal medical services;” and (5) 
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“non-medical personal and social support services”128   If over-protection of 
property rights in TRIPs impair these goods or their functional equivalents, 
then they violate the fair equality of opportunity principle.
The focus on affordable medicines in low-income countries is on Daniels’ 
fourth category, the availability of medical services, including access to 
medicines to combat HIV AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases 
common in low-income countries.  To the extent that TRIPs impairs the ability 
of persons in low-income countries to obtain medicines of this sort, it violates 
the fair equality of opportunity principle.  To meet the fair equality of 
opportunity principle, it is not required that these medicines be “free” or 
without cost to users.  Rather, they should not be so costly as to unreasonably 
impair the life plans of individuals in the countries in question.  In short, they 
should be affordable, with affordability determined based on some sort or 
means testing.    
Though more research directly on these questions is necessary, the 
tentative evidence suggests that the fair equality of opportunity principle is not 
met in many situations in the low-income countries.  Prices that are “patent 
protecting” make many drugs out of reach in the low-income countries.  
Risking an oversimplified picture of an otherwise rich contracting and firm 
structure, consumers (which may be countries where a public health system is 
the primary buyer of drugs) typically buy drugs from three kinds of sellers.  
First, they buy from the drug manufacturers themselves.  This first avenue 
requires importing either from the firms who hold the patents for the drugs or 
from firms licensed by the patent holder to produce the drugs.  Second, they 
import from a generic manufacturer, who might make the drug without any 
license from the patent holder, a possible solution only prior to when TRIPs 
came into full force.  Third, they could buy the drugs from producers inside 
their own borders, who do not necessarily hold any license from the patent 
holder.  India, for example, prior to bringing its patent system into compliance 
with TRIPs, could produce drugs cheaply and generically because it did not 
recognize product patents.  TRIPs essentially collapses all these transaction 
forms into one: purchases from patent holders or their authorized producers.  
Doha provides some limited exceptions for compulsory licensing but it is too 
early to assess its effect.  
The UN Millennium Project Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and 
Access to Essential Medicines describes as a barrier to the development of 
affordable new medicines the following:
[TRIPs] may block access to affordable new medicines and 
vaccines. After January 2005, generic production in India, the
source of many vital existing medicines for developing 
countries without productive capabilities, will be fully subject to 
128 Ibid., 158.
29
TRIPS provisions . . . .  Concerns  also exist that the August 30, 
2003, decision reached by the WTO General Council 
concerning a waiver for TRIPS Article 31(f) (which would  
allow a compulsory license to be issued by the country in need 
and  by the country that can produce the medicine for export) 
will be too cumbersome for developing countries to exploit . . . . 
Finally, the growing number of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements with major trading partners, such as the United 
States and the European Union, may often contain provisions 
that limit developing countries’ use of existing flexibilities 
under TRIPS to protect public health (such as restrictive 
compulsory licensing conditions and parallel importation  
provisions, extended data protection, and forcing medicines 
regulatory  agencies to take on national patent office oversight 
duties).129
This paper provides only a sketch of how to apply the Rawlsian criteria and 
therefore it does not provide any sort of statistical correlation between normal 
species functioning and drug prices, though the connection seems clear enough 
for some tentative conclusions.  The logic is as follows: Illness is a major 
reason why people in low-income countries are poor.  People in low-income 
countries are ill in large part because they cannot afford drugs to prevent or 
cure disease.  Finally, they cannot afford drugs because of high patent 
protecting prices.  The WHO has found:
The consequences of this inadequacy include an enormous loss 
of life from preventable or treatable diseases (such as 
tuberculosis, pneumonia, acute respiratory infections, malaria, 
diabetes, and hypertension) and significant human suffering, 
particularly among the poor and marginalized populations of the 
world. The lack of access to life-saving and health-supporting 
medicines for more than 2 billion poor people stands as a direct 
contradiction to the fundamental principle of health as a human 
right. Illness is a major reason that the nearly poor slide into 
profound poverty.  Illness decreases people’s ability to work (be 
it remunerative or not). Illness orphans children and prevents 
them from getting the education they need. Women and 
children make up the majority of the poor, and their low status 
in many societies often means that they have even less access to 
medicines. Improving access to medicines must be a key 
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component of strategies to strengthen healthcare.130
The WHO estimates that one-third of the world’s population, about 1.7 billion 
people, lack access to the most basic essential medicines.131  In the poorest 
countries this figure increases to one-half.132  The WHO and the United 
Kingdom Department of Finance and International Development (DFID) have 
estimated that proper access to medicines would save about 4 million lives 
annually.133  From the standpoint of burdens on worst off groups, the poorest 
of the poor, pay the highest out-of-pocket expenses for medicines.134  Public 
sectors in developing countries cannot provide affordable medicines 
reliably.135  Medical insurance schemes cover only eight percent of the 
population in Africa and these schemes may not cover prescription 
medicines.136  The DFID has found a “mismatch between pharmaceutical 
needs in developing countries and the current nature of the global 
pharmaceutical market.”137   This mismatch is the result of two problems that 
relate directly to intellectual property: the inability of people in low-income 
countries to pay for medicines and the resulting lack of incentives for 
pharmaceutical firms to develop medicines for diseases that disproportionately 
afflict persons in the low-income countries.138
The current regime of global intellectual property rights also seems to 
violate the Rawlsian difference principle.  The difference principle essentially 
provides that inequality must benefit everyone.  As long as the primary social 
goods of the worst off group are increasing, inequality is fair and can continue 
to increase.  As soon as the primary social goods of the worst off group stop 
increasing, then the society in question has reached the maximum inequality 
permitted.  We can conceptualize low-income countries or people in those 
countries as the worst off groups in global society.  TRIPs makes people in 
low-income countries worse off.  The current global intellectual property 
system, with patent protecting prices, makes the worst off groups, the poorest 
of the poor in low income countries, even worse off, while benefiting better off 
groups such as pharmaceutical firms in high-income countries.  Much of the 
empirics that would support the analysis under the fair equality of opportunity 
principle would be relevant in the application of the difference principle as 
well.  The main difference in the analysis, however, would be that Rawls’s 
analysis of the difference principle facilitates some mathemetization in the 
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form of comparisons of welfare based on the allocation of primary social 
goods.
The solutions to unfairness in the TRIPs regime would not differ from 
those suggested in the next section below.  Notably, the Rawlsian fairness 
criteria do not specify a particular solution, but we can use them to understand 
the fairness of a solution.  This is not a controversial point.  In this sense, 
ethical standards do not differ from economic standards.  They explain why but 
not how.  The “how” is up to policy makers and lawyers.
As I have stressed in this paper, I have not provided a sufficiently detailed 
set of testable criteria for assessing TRIPs and fair equality of opportunity, 
though I have tried to provide a sketch of the issues that need further study.   
The purpose of this paper is to begin the exploration of methods for assessing 
fairness, not in providing definitive answers in the application to a particular 
area.
2. The Scanlonian Approach
The Scanlonian contractualist analysis proceeds in sketch form as follows.  
First, to use a phrase offered by Wenar, what do we owe to “distant” others?  
The answer in Scanlon’s account would be principles no one could reasonably 
reject.  Using Scanlon’s terms, we would examine objections to granting 
intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals versus objections to not granting 
them.139  The question may not be so binary, and it may be a question of the 
strength of those rights.  Putting this into terms more easily understandable to 
lawyers, we would examine objections to patent rights versus objections to 
exceptions or derogations from patent rights.  This gets us into examining 
burdens and benefits.  As tentatively sketched out above, the burdens of poor 
health in low-income countries are substantial.  On the other hand, losses to 
pharmaceutical companies do not necessarily follow.140  The benefits are 
improved health in the populations of to the low-income countries are 
substantial.  It would seem that strong intellectual property rights are 
reasonably rejectable while weak (or in some cases no) rights are not.  Can we 
develop these arguments through the articulation of a principle?
Scanlon’s Principle of Rescue may be relevant. He articulates his Rescue 
Principle for these cases: “if you are presented with a situation in which you 
can prevent something very bad from happening, or alleviate someone’s dire 
plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be 
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wrong not to do so.”141  The Principle of Helpfulness, on the other hand, 
applies when someone else would benefit from your help, and your help would 
mean a slight to moderate sacrifice on your part.  It would seem that the 
Principle of Rescue is more relevant, given the dire need for affordable 
medicines in the low-income countries. 
I have sketched out above the burdens that TRIPs places on consumers of 
drugs in low-income countries.  Recent economic research on antibiotics in the 
Indian pharmaceutical market indicates that these losses may be substantial, 
but that profit gains to pharmaceutical firms are orders of magnitude lower.142
Thus, it would seem that compulsory licensing or some other form of 
derogation from patent rights in pharmaceuticals could in certain cases result in 
substantial benefits to persons in low-income countries with only slight or 
moderate sacrifice to patent holders.  The Principle of Rescue would seem 
squarely to apply in such circumstances.  
Could we derive a Principle of Equality in Normal Species Functioning 
from contractualism?  Recall that for contractualism a “priority of the worst 
off” is a “feature of certain particular moral contexts rather than a general 
structural feature of contractualist moral argument.”143  Contractualism, 
lacking a political idea of equality, makes no claims about equality or initial 
endowments.  Therefore, we might have difficulties with strict notions of 
equality because they might be reasonably rejectable by some.  On the other 
hand, some limited notions of equality will survive the Scanlonian complaint 
model.  A limited form of equality exists in the concept of health care as a 
means to obtain normal species functioning at the level outlined here.  The 
argument is that health care (which includes availability of essential 
medicines) “has as its goal normal functioning and so concentrates on a 
specific class of obvious disadvantages and tries to eliminate them.”144  The 
focus is not on eliminating all natural and social differences, but on eliminating 
natural and social disadvantages brought about by disease.
What if derogating from intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals 
actually would do substantial harm to the incentive to innovate, to the point 
where worst off groups, and other groups, are made worse off?  Some avenues 
nevertheless exist that would allow countries to meet the requirements of fair 
access to essential medicines while still preserving the rights of patent holders. 
The most obvious solution is donor assistance to low-income countries for the 
purchase of pharmaceuticals.  Low-income countries tend not to have the 
manufacturing base to take advantage of compulsory licensing.  The donor 
assistance approach would also avoid difficulties associated with parallel 
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importation of generic drugs.  Donors would pay patent protecting prices.  
Such an approach shifts the question away from discussions of rights to health 
care to requirements on those able to provide assistance to provide it. In the 
current international legal system, no such obligations exist.  Assistance is aid 
and aid is charity.  Scanlon provides a procedure for deriving principles that no 
one can reasonably reject and that helps us identify obligations and 
requirements.  Some countries have taken steps toward creating such 
obligations, though these obligations remain essentially self-imposed.  The 
United Kingdom, for example, has undertaken a purchase commitment of 200-
300 million doses each of HIV/AIDS and malaria vaccines if such vaccines are 
developed.145 One purpose for a purchase commitment is to provide 
pharmaceutical firms with an incentive to innovate in the area of neglected 
diseases, which are found in low-income countries, where affordability at 
patent protecting prices is a major obstacle.146  Another possible form of 
obligation are trust funds, if countries could be obligated to submit funds to 
them.147
V. Conclusion
Developing and applying principles of fairness to global economic 
institutions is hard work.  It would be easier simply to accept the dictates of 
power relations within the global economic system as a given and go from 
there.  The limited goal of this paper is to produce more reflection on 
alternatives to economic efficiency and other quasi-utilitarian conceptions of 
normativity in the international economic order, with special reference to 
recent work in contractualist moral philosophy.  I have tried to develop a few 
modest insights from moral philosophy into heuristics for evaluating trade 
agreements. I have tried to offer an account that differs from the 
Sen/Nussbaum capabilities approach.  The broader notion here is that my 
approach is an alternative to the Sen/Nussbaum approach. 
We are not far along on this process, and have much to do.  Until we derive 
and use principles rather than almost totally rely on states of affairs, we will 
continue to neglect the question of justice in the world trading system. 
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